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Liberty and.Equality Under the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment
Kenneth W. Starr*
The dynamic between liberty and equality may be observed
in the dialogue among the Justices of the Supreme Court,
especially in recent Religion Clause cases. At the outset, it is
useful to recall the newness of this Court. Since 1986, Chief
Justice Rehnquist has been elevated to his present
responsibility and four new Justices have joined the Court. For
the Supreme Court, seven years is a relatively brief period; but
during this period the Court has become unstable, especially
since the departures of Justices Brennan and Marshall. Their
views on a wide range of issues were not and, most likely, will
not be accepted by any of the six Justices appointed or elevated
during the 1980s and 1990s.' While Justices Breman and
Marshall sat on the Court, their liberal jurisprudence tended to
drive those more centrist and conservative Justices into one
another's arms. Their departure seems to have had a
balkanizing effect, magnified by the activity of the everquestioning Justice Scalia. The result has been a series of
splintered decisions with only one UnlEylng theme-~urprise.~
Recent years have also witnessed vigorous debate within
the Court about the themes of liberty and equality, especially
the efficacy of equality in rebuffing free exercise challenges. In
Employment Division v. Smith,3Justice Scalia championed the
no-special-favors approach. He relied on equality of legal

* From 1989 t o 1993, Judge Starr, formerly a member of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sewed as Solicitor General
of the United States.
1. For example, no one on the Court would embrace the position that capital
punishment is unconstitutional under any and all circumstances. That view, which
Justices Brennan and Marshall embraced so vigorously and with such moral force
in case &r case, notwithstanding the concerns of stare decisis, clearly struck
those with more moderate impulses as extreme.
2.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Lee v.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
3.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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applicability to rebut the suggestion that special exemptions, or
at least a fair accommodation of religious liberty and
expression, were needed in order to permit religious beliefs to
be translated into action. As Justice Scalia saw it, the
democratic process must be permitted to work. As long as they
discipline themselves through the equality principle,
legislatures must be permitted to act and legislate in a n acrossthe-board fashion4-no special favors, tempered by the golden
rule. I n fashioning this result, concerns over judicial
competence and power guided Justice Scalia and the majority
to invoke such ancient no-special-favors cases as Reynolds v.
United States5 and, ironically, Justice Frankfurter's short-lived
triumph in Minersville School District v. Gobitis: the classic
no-special-favors case. Relying on the no-special-favors
rationale, Justice Scalia wrote:
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long
struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from
obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or
restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of
religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of
a political society does not relieve the citizen from the
discharge of political responsibilities.'

All are equal under the law with no favors or dispensations.
Religious minorities need not fear, according to Justice
Scalia, because democracy works. Arizona, Colorado, and New
Mexico, states with significant Native American populations,
had each crafted statutory exceptions for the sacramental use
of peyote.' The implicit message of assurance was that Oregon
would likely follow suit once the press had publicized the plight
of the Native American Church member~hip.~
Gone forever,
Justice Scalia and the majority seem to be saying, are the bad
old days in Oregon when the Oregon legislature might decide,
in a fit of anti-Catholic fervor, to effectively abolish parochial
schools through generally applicable legi~lation.'~
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 879-82.
98 U.S.145 (1878).

310 U.S. 586 (1940).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Gobitis, 310 US. at 594-95).
8.
See ARE. REV. STAT. ANN. # 13-3402(B)(1)-(2) (1989); COLO. REV. STAT.
$ 12-22-317(3)(1985);N.M.STAT.ANN. 8 30-31-60)(Michie Supp. 1989).
9. Oregon has since enacted an exemption for the sacramental use of peyote.
See OR. REV.STAT.8 475.992(5) (1991).
10. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). As an aside, Judge
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In Smith, the principle of equality was employed to defeat
a liberty claim under the Free Exercise Clause. However, this
result should not mask two benefits that flow from a judicially
enforced equality regime. The fmst is illustrated by the Equal
Access Act," passed in the wake of W i d m r u. Vincent.12
Widmar established that religiously based clubs may hold
activities on university grounds on an equal basis with other
extracurricular groups. Equality is such a powerN normative
principle that a broad political consensus can be achieved i n
favor of a nondiscrimination measure. Warring factions on
Capitol Hill with respect to voluntary prayer in public schools
came together under the equality banner in overwhelming
bipartisan support of equal access. As demonstrated by Board
of Education v. Mergens,13 students who attend public high
schools now enjoy federal statutory protection if they desire to
engage voluntarily in Bible study groups, so long as the school
permits any extracurricular clubs to operate.
Equality can thus be quite protective of fkee exercise
values when an assault on religious expression or activity in
public institutions is premised, as is frequently the case, on
Establishment Clause grounds. With the public mind, and to a
great extent the judicial mind, fdled with images of
Jeffersonian metaphors of high impregnable walls,'* the
equality principle is a useful tool for those who believe that
they have been singled out for disparately unfavorable
treatment because of their religious beliefs. The unsuccessful
effort of the Lamb's Chapel group in New York State to show
the Turn Your Heart Toward Home fdm series on public school
premises during the evening hours illustrates this point rather
nicely.l5
Bork, responding to concerns over his approach to substantive due process during
his confirmation hearings in 1987, suggested that the Oregon law of general
applicability requiring all students to attend schools created and operated by the
state could perhaps be invalidated under the Free Exercise Clause. 14 THE
SUPREMECOURT OF THE UNITEDSTATES:HEARINGSAND REPORTSON SUCCESSFUL
AND UNSUCCESSFUL
NOMINATIONS
OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
BY THE SENATE
JUDICIARY
C O M M ~ E1916-1987,
E
at 190, 352 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron
Jacobstein comps., 1990); see also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 11 (1971).
11. Pub. L. No. 98-377 8 802, 98 Stat. 1302 (codified at 20 U.S.C. 8 4071
(1988)).
12. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
13. 496 US. 226 (1990).
14. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2668-76 (1992) (Souter, J.,
concurring); Reynolds v. United States, 98 US. 145, 164 (1878).
15. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381 (2d

4

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993

The second advantage of the equality principle is entirely
practical. As Justice Scalia pointed out in Smith, turning our
growing religious pluralism and diversity to his advantage, a
diverse people "cannot afford the luxury of deeming
presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every
regulation of conduct that does not protect a n interest of the
highest order."16 A related point, for those skeptical of the
capacity of the judiciary to engage in a principled and
consistent superintendence of the democratic process through
a n accommodation analysis, is that legislatures are more likely
to be aware of, and perhaps even sensitive to, the need to
protect minority religious practices. Under this antiMadisonian view, it is no longer politically acceptable to
persecute minorities.
The response to all of this may well be, "So what?" The
equality principle may be useful to prevent the excesses of the
Westside School Districts of the world, with their legal advisors
counseling them to throw Bridget Mergens and her Bible study
group off campus," but it certainly does not help the Amish of
Wisconsin keep alive their religious traditions in a secular
age,'' nor does it permit religiously inspired home education.
Religious liberty is left virtually unprotected in this age of
secularist-dominated legislation and regulation.
One can thus reflect on Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith
with a sense of constitutional wonderment. Have I somehow
entered a Narnian world, in which the Turkish delight of
equality masks a wintry world where some very evil things are
going on?'' Could it be that communion wine for Roman
Catholics, or animal sacrifices for adherents of Santeria, both
venerable practices going to the heart of religious belief and
expression, nonetheless depend on the sufferance of the
majority? So what if Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico permit
the sacramental use of peyote? Although this permission exists
today, the winds of democracy can change. Skinheads, neoNazis, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, and political turmoil in
Russia all remind us of the fragdity of democracy. As Donald
Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
16. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
17. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 US. 226 (1990).
18. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972).
,
THE WARDROBE
(New York
19. Cf. C.S. LEWIS,THE LION,THE W ~ H AND
Deluxe ed. 1983) (1950).
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Kagan has eloquently reminded us, "[democracy] is . . . one of
the rarest, most delicate and fragile flowers in the jungle of
himan e~perience."~~
Democracy today may be flowering in
Latin America and elsewhere, but can we say with confidence
that the racial hatred demonstrated recently in Los Angeles
and Crown Heights is not a harbinger of really nasty things t o
come here at home?
In this sobering context, Justice O'Connor's voice is raised
in favor of keeping the judicial watchdog out in the yard and on
duty, barking and occasionally biting a t the majoritarian heel.
Equality alone, she urges, is a hollow promise, the stuff of
Orwellian worlds. Equality without more is a snare, a delusion.
It is, in essence, a full-scale Daryl Gates-style retreat from the
battlefront. So trust the judiciary, she would urge, as a coequal
keeper of the constitutional flame of liberty.
Perhaps both sides of the debate should calm down and
lower the rhetorical level. But religious liberty, which some of
us thought was at stake in Lee u. W e i ~ m a n ,is~ ~such an
important part of the history and tradition of the American
people that the level will probably remain quite high.22In Lee
u. Weisman the Court viewed the record as partaking of the
same nature as state-ordered prayer in Engel u. Vitale.23This
is not the only reasonable way of looking at the record. I
submit as Exhibit A Judge Levin Campbell's very thoughtful
dissent characterizing graduation prayer as an act of religious
liberty and an appeal to the traditions of an historically
religious people:
I suspect that most Americans of all persuasions-including
the increasing numbers who adhere to religions or ethical
systems outside the Judeo-Christian framework-find it is
appropriate and meaningful for public speakers to invoke the
deity not as an expression of a particular sectarian belief but
as an expression of transcendent values and of the mystery
and idealism so absent from much of modern cu1tu.1-e.24

DONALDKAGAN,PERICLES OF ATHENSAND THE BIRTH OF DEMOCRACY
2
20.
(1991).
112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
21.
This point was illustrated nicely by President Clinton's choice, as an ad of
22.
religious liberty, to generously quote from scripture in his inaugural address and
his decision to invite the Reverend Billy Graham to deliver a prayer asking for
God's blessings on a free people.
23.
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
24.
Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1098-99 (1st Cir. 1980) (Campbell, J.,
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But a t the same time, the Supreme Court made it clear i n
Weisman that the State cannot be in the business of
suppressing the prayers of an historically religious people. And
thus, it would be too much, as some of my fiends in the
Academy would do, to say that there can be no prayer at
graduation ceremonies. A c a r e m reading of Justice Kennedy's
opinion, I believe, suggests sensitivity to the concern that
religious liberty must be protected, as well as a Madisonian
concern for the right of individuals not to participate, to enjoy
the freedom of conscience. This was captured i n the modern era
by Justice Jackson in West virginia- Board of Education v.
B~rnette~~:
The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy,
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech,
a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fbndamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they
depend on the outcome of no e l e ~ t i o n s . ~ ~

The vision of the liberty of the individual has never been
expressed more eloquently than it was in Barnette, the case
that overruled Gobitis, which, ironically, Justice Scalia saw fit
to invoke in Smith.27
Rejected was the egalitarian, some would say statist, model
of Gobitis. Maybe, just maybe, constitutional history is about to
repeat itself.

dissenting), affd, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); see also Stein v. Plainwell Community
Sch., 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987) (upholding nonsectarian prayers at a public
school graduation).
25.
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
26.
Id. at 638.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (citing Gobitis).
27.

